{"id":2482,"date":"2021-10-13T13:54:15","date_gmt":"2021-10-13T11:54:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/herito.pl\/?post_type=artykul&p=2482"},"modified":"2023-07-17T14:54:18","modified_gmt":"2023-07-17T12:54:18","slug":"2482-2","status":"publish","type":"artykul","link":"https:\/\/herito.pl\/en\/artykul\/2482-2\/","title":{"rendered":"What Does Europe Need Nations for?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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What is the condition of the nation in Europe and in the contemporary world? Although the national community was formed as one of the elements of modernity, it is fair to ask about its role or even legitimacy in the period of postmodernism. Has the nation fulfilled its social role, and is it therefore entering its twilight years?<\/strong><\/p>\n

As we all know, each social reality, both contemporary and historical, is passed on to people in words. So in the context of analysing the phenomenon of the nation we should distinguish two aspects: on the one hand the sphere of real events <\/em>and actions, and on the other the sphere of words<\/em>, concepts. Although this is a commonly accepted distinction, not all researchers use it in their reflections on causal relations. So the question \u201cWhat do we need nations for\u201d must be considered from two points of view. First, we must reflect on the concept and definition of a nation, on the word itself and all concomitants. Second, we must consider the social or political reality: I mean here the reality of the social group called the nation. And we must not forget one more element, namely space; we should remember that the term \u201cnation\u201d, although a mostly European phenomenon (and term), is now used in the global context. So studying this term cannot be limited to the European perspective; the concept should be placed in specific spatial frameworks and take into account territorial differences, especially differences between Europe and the rest of the world.<\/p>\n

Starting from these basic premises, I would like to analyse and prove three fundamental claims:<\/p>\n

First, that in various epochs and languages the\u00a0concept of a\u00a0\u201cnation\u201d was and still is used as a\u00a0description of very varied historical situations and social elements.<\/p>\n

Second, communities, the\u00a0large social groups described using this term, have developed in historical terms and from a\u00a0typological point of view were and still are \u2013 despite the\u00a0basic common features \u2013 very much varied.<\/p>\n

Third, the\u00a0nation as a\u00a0concept and a\u00a0phenomenon of national identity is a\u00a0typically European phenomenon; the\u00a0term nation was \u201cexported\u201d outside Europe and there, in different civilisations and systems of values, gained a\u00a0different meaning, in line with local conditions.<\/p>\n

Terms have a life of their own<\/strong><\/h1>\n

The term \u201cnation\u201d is not a word like any other; it is not used only as a technical term, like, for example, the state, ministry or inhabitant of a city; the word retains a certain emotional colouring and often goes beyond \u2013 or seems to go beyond \u2013 mere calculation (understood as rational choice).<\/p>\n

For most people belonging to a nation was and still is connected with a positive feeling. Representing one\u2019s nation is a matter of honour and one should be happy about its successes \u2013 now especially in sport, cinema and technology.<\/p>\n

Previously, though, a categorical imperative was present, today rarely encountered: a citizen was supposed not only to draw benefits from national belonging, that is use its existence in his own interest, and perhaps boast of its successes; he was also supposed to bear responsibility for this community. This imperative demanded of the citizen that he be useful <\/em>for the community through active work for its good and the reputation of its members.<\/p>\n

How did it come to that? We are certainly dealing here with a legacy \u2013 or liability? \u2013 born in the 19th century. Some researchers believe that the emotional content connected with the term \u201cnation\u201d originates from the French Revolution, whereas others derive it from the philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder, and others still perceive the influence of Romanticism here. The Herderian idea of a nation as a divine creation and the theory of the native language and national culture as an inherent value certainly influenced many of his readers. Undoubtedly one of the objects of Romantic love and enthusiastic admiration was the nation, its culture and history. Chronologically speaking, though, such a spiritual attitude is not the \u201cbeginning\u201d, and the search for the reasons of emotionalising the concept of \u201cnation\u201d must start much earlier<\/em>. For the historical-political and cultural-semantic roots of this emotional element go much deeper.<\/p>\n

Let us first consider the cultural-linguistic element. As is commonly known, in almost all European languages the word \u201cnation\u201d is a derivative (or a translation) of the Latin noun natio<\/em>; and this word stems from the verb nascor<\/em> (natus sum<\/em>), meaning that something is part of a specific context by dint of its origin, being born in particular circumstances. As we all know, the term nationes<\/em>, used at universities and councils, referred to students and Church notables originating from the same region. However, only specialists know that the territorial relations described as natio<\/em> are not always coextensive with geographical terms used today; but researchers realise that this distinction \u2013 used already in the late Middle Ages and regarded as regional \u2013 often also accounted for the linguistic belonging. <\/em>So the concept was already undergoing a certain \u201cnationalisation\u201d, although in the Middle Ages it had little to do with this form of \u201csocialisation\u201d now contained in the definition of a \u201cnation\u201d.<\/p>\n

Even on the eve of the modern era, the word natio<\/em> was used in reference to elites belonging to the same state \u2013 in Hungary and Poland it functioned for many centuries in the phrases natio hungarica<\/em> and natio polonica<\/em> and described the politically privileged class, that is the gentry. Besides that a group characterised, among other things, by common linguistic features was also described with the Latin word gens<\/em>. Yet another medieval term is the word lingua<\/em> (Latin for language), defining a particular linguistic group.<\/p>\n

Since the 15th century and above all in the 16th century the Latin natio<\/em> was commonly accepted and found a permanent place in the developing national languages. From the very beginning the process of acquiring a particular meaning by this term occurred in various conditions, dependent on the political situation in particular European macroregions. But the process can be followed quite precisely since the times of the Enlightenment. On the one hand English lexicons, in line with the political situation, under the term English nation <\/em>understood the politically coexisting people, its structure ordered by the state<\/em>. The Grande Encyclop\u00e9die<\/em> too speaks of la nation<\/em> as the sum of the subjects (or population) living under the reign of one ruler and subordinated to a law identical for all. On the other hand, in the German from that period the term Nation<\/em> (and its synonym Volk<\/em> \u2013 people) is associated with a common speech and culture<\/em>. It was similar in the Czech language and most Slavic languages. Regardless of the differences, from early modern times \u201cnation\u201d acquired a positive ring <\/em>and was associated, for example, with the concept of homeland. Even during the Enlightenment, its representatives published their reflections on the subject of \u201cnational pride\u201d. They conducted disputes on national virtues and specific features of particular national groups, which they called nations. They were also interested in identifying \u201cnational enemies\u201d. So one can venture a claim that the positive dimension of the term \u201cnation\u201d was enhanced when the Enlightenment patriotism <\/em>of educated elites took the floor, finding its expression especially in the idea of love for one\u2019s homeland and countrymen exhibited in particular actions.<\/p>\n

All this happened decades before the French Revolution, with which \u2013 as our textbooks would have it \u2013 glorifying of the nation began and started to spread all over Europe. I do not intend to question the significance of this revolution. Thanks to it the term \u201cnation\u201d, supported with the idea of civil society, gained a new content; for the nation should be formed by all citizens<\/em>, equal before the law and acting in solidarity. And all of them were also to bear responsibility for spreading progress and the struggle for freedom in Europe. At this point one should also state the caveat that the term \u201cnation\u201d acquired its civic dimension earlier, but only thanks to the French Revolution did it assume a universal meaning. The Revolution, and to an even larger extent the Napoleonic period in the history of the grande nation<\/em>, turned the construct of a nation into an individualised, intellectualised and ideological term, and it became a kind of \u201cmandatory\u201d common good.<\/p>\n

Therefore, when looking for the origins of the emotionalisation and glorification of the concept of a \u201cnation\u201d, practically until today identified with a later period, we find ourselves in the times preceding the appearance of Romanticism by at least one generation. And it is this period which is sometimes held \u201cresponsible\u201d for idealising the nation and for national enthusiasm. I believe this view to be mistaken. Of course, the Romantics \u2013 or at least some of them \u2013 took up the national idea and cultivated it, but they did not \u201cdiscover\u201d it and were not its authors. I suppose that such emotions connected both with the nation and the romantic stance are derived from the same or closely related roots. It was the deepening uncertainty of an individual faced with collapsing values and identity of the old society, the fading ancien r\u00e9gime. <\/em>This uncertainty generated the need to discover new values and a new belonging. Of course, not all Romantics discovered this new centrum securitatis<\/em> in the national community, and not all patriots became Romantics. By the way, it could be interesting and inspiring to find out to what extent the idea of national identity was a part of the idea of Romanticism and how many Romantics were active in the national movements in particular European countries. But a weak point of such an undertaking would be the rather big differences in defining the term \u201cRomanticism\u201d.<\/p>\n

Regardless of the above, there is no doubt that in the 19th century the term \u201cnation\u201d was already a commonly accepted value. The existence of the nation and belonging to it were associated with something honourable and prestigious, but also imposing certain obligations on all its members. The national idea was carefully cultivated by the emerging nations in Germany, Bohemia, Norway and Hungary.<\/p>\n

As the existence of the nation contained the aspect of magnificence, not every group could freely use this dignified name. Magnificence, like nobility in aristocratic families, obliged the nation to prove its historical origins.<\/p>\n

In accordance with the spirit of historicism, popular in the 19th century, the nation was understood as a historical (that is, to use a current term, \u201cperennialist\u201d) phenomenon, the existence of which could be traced back to the Middle Ages. And as in the 19th century only political history was regarded as a true science of history, it was obvious that aspirations to being a nation not grounded in political history did not make any sense. In the revolutionary year 1848 the distinction between \u201chistorical\u201d and \u201cnon-historical\u201d nations became a subject of heated political discussions in Central Europe, provoked especially by German liberals.<\/p>\n

This all meant that historically proven statehood traceable to the Middle Ages was regarded as a necessary condition for accepting a given group as a nation. Interruptions or periods of shaky statehood were tolerated. But there was no rule saying for how long and to what extent the statehood could have been interrupted. And it is not known whether an autonomous status, concerning, for example, Catalonia, was acknowledged as a valid substitute for statehood.<\/p>\n

Simultaneously and in a growing opposition to this traditional distinction, its meaning was brought up-to-date, in the domain of associations assigned to the word \u201cnation\u201d. One could \u201cawaken\u201d a nation defined by its language and culture and announce its existence regardless of whether it could claim medieval statehood. Rather than solving the problem, however, this moved it to another sphere: since historical statehood was not decisive for acknowledging the existence of a nation, what features should have been \u201cpossessed\u201d by a community wanting to be recognised as a nation?<\/p>\n

The question of what a nation is and what it is not became the subject of study for positivist science, which attempted to define objective criteria. This process occurred in an aura of scholastic \u201crealism\u201d: it was believed that nations had a real existence and that there were \u201ctrue\u201d nations, which only had to be scientifically defined.<\/p>\n

This belief received the first blow from the subjectivist definition of a nation, speaking about the national awareness <\/em>of its members. This position was represented not only by the often quoted Ernest Renan but also by the theoretically inclined German statisticians from this period, who were longing for immutable criteria of national belonging. Another blow, unfortunately almost forgotten today, came in the early 20th century from the leading Marxist Otto Bauer, who claimed that one should distinguish many stages of historical development and, accordingly, many types of nation, from the nation of the gentry through the nation of burghers and intellectuals to the nation of the capitalist period. And Bauer was not alone in his views: in 1907, when his book about the national question appeared, the German historian Friedrich Meinecke proposed a division of nations into two types: state nation and cultural nation.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0turn of the\u00a020th century saw the\u00a0most intense debates on the\u00a0definition of a\u00a0nation, with a\u00a0new term of political (but not yet scientific) discourse entering the\u00a0stage: nationalism. This was a\u00a0word without a\u00a0past, a\u00a0neologism with emotional overtones. For\u00a0some, nationalism was a\u00a0synonym for love of one\u2019s nation (for example in France), which meant that it provoked positive feelings, while for others (especially for social democrats and pacifists) it posed a\u00a0threat to humanity. The\u00a0second definition was in a\u00a0way confirmed by atrocities during the First World War perpetrated on behalf of the\u00a0nation.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0various interpretations of this term notwithstanding, it is understandable that with the\u00a0growing popularity of the\u00a0subjective definition of the\u00a0nation the\u00a0term \u201cnationalism\u201d also successfully invaded the\u00a0language of scholarship, beginning with the\u00a0USA. This process, which in the\u00a0United States began as early as the\u00a0 1930s, supported especially by Hans Kohns\u2019s \u201cidea of nationalism\u201d, was after the\u00a0Second World War\u00a0also adopted in continental Europe, first in social sciences and from the\u00a01960s in historical research as well. Of\u00a0course, this term, despite the\u00a0reiterated claims that it was a\u00a0\u201cvalue-free\u201d concept, was variously interpreted in particular languages, in line with associations provoked by the\u00a0word \u201cnation\u201d. In\u00a0some languages it really was free of negative overtones, while in others it had a\u00a0strongly pejorative ring to it. In\u00a0my view the\u00a0aspiration to a\u00a0universal use of this term is a\u00a0\u201ccuckoo\u2019s egg\u201d dropped by American scholarship into the\u00a0European nest.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0term has gained an\u00a0independent existence and, what\u2019s more, the\u00a0phenomenon it describes dates back to the\u00a019th century, when the\u00a0word did not yet even exist! Everything that concerned the\u00a0\u201cnation\u201d was described as \u201cnationalism\u201d, usually without any distinctions, at\u00a0best with a\u00a0qualifier making its meaning more precise. Some authors (for example, Eli\u00a0Kedouri or Ernest Gellner) saw nationalism as the\u00a0moving force of the\u00a0nation. But\u00a0although nationalism was perceived as primus movens, prime mover, it was supposed to be causally explainable. There are few equally striking examples of a\u00a0word or term becoming independent of reality and retroactively defining \u2013 or in a\u00a0sense even \u201craping\u201d \u2013 reality in an\u00a0authoritarian way.<\/p>\n

I do not intend to argue here with the\u00a0thoughtless use of the\u00a0term \u201cnationalism\u201d. Suffice it to say that most authors subsume under this term all opinions, actions and institutions which are connected with the\u00a0nation or declare an\u00a0intent at\u00a0such a\u00a0connotation. However, it remains an\u00a0open question what should be understood by the\u00a0term \u201cnation\u201d.<\/p>\n

I am glad that in recent years more and more authors are refraining from using the\u00a0concept of nationalism as a\u00a0scholarly instrument, preferring such alternative descriptions as patriotism, national identity, awareness or belonging. I myself belong to the\u00a0minority of researchers who understand the\u00a0term \u201cnationalism\u201d in its narrower, negative sense \u2013 namely as a\u00a0hateful national egoism, putting one\u2019s own nation above others, mixed with xenophobia and chauvinism. In\u00a0such a\u00a0context the\u00a0dividing line between negatively understood nationalism and national identity or patriotism is blurred; in other words, nationalism is constantly present and in some historical circumstances its voice may prove dominant.<\/p>\n

The European nation emerged without \u201cnationalism\u201d<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Let us now leave the sphere of words and turn to social and cultural reality.<\/p>\n

The departure point for my reflections is the following, empirically provable fact: the majority of European communities describing themselves as \u201cnations\u201d adopted the form of civil society <\/em>\u2013 to put the matter succinctly \u2013 in the period of modernisation. The modern capitalist society emerging at the time had to undergo the process of restructuring.<\/p>\n

I will propose here a\u00a0certain thought experiment: let us imagine that, studying the\u00a0reforms introduced in the\u00a0modern times, describing the\u00a0social turbulences and changes, we do not know the\u00a0word \u201cnation\u201d (not to mention \u201cnationalism\u201d). I will present a\u00a0number of social and cultural transformation processes in such a\u00a0way as if no general term covered them.<\/p>\n

In early modern history, roughly between the\u00a0mid-17th century and the\u00a019th century, in all regions of Eastern and Western Europe there was a\u00a0process of gradual or violent collapse of the\u00a0structures of the\u00a0late feudal ancien r\u00e9gime: first, the\u00a0traditional feudal bonds and relations were questioned or even broken. Second, the\u00a0appearance of manufacture and industry undermined and redirected the\u00a0structures of the\u00a0traditional system of agricultural and guild production. The\u00a0old feudal world of the\u00a0inheritance system was shrinking, its rules were becoming less restrictive and the\u00a0class barriers not so obstructive. Moreover, the\u00a0religious legitimacy of privileged feudal authorities \u2013 and consequently also the\u00a0traditional system of values \u2013 was increasingly questioned. More and more people transcended the\u00a0old patriarchal world, to which the\u00a0generations of their immediate ancestors still belonged: this process was driven, on the\u00a0one hand, by people looking for work outside their home place, and on the\u00a0other hand by expanded access to university education. The\u00a0idea of equality of all people before the\u00a0law and state institutions was also gaining ground.<\/p>\n

These processes occurred non-synchronically, that is in different periods in particular countries. They resulted in an\u00a0identity crisis, a\u00a0sense of uncertainty and their concomitants, initially appearing above all among educated persons: looking for new dogmas and forms of belonging as well as a\u00a0new system of humane values.<\/p>\n

An effect of discouragement connected with the growing inefficiency or even impossibility of identifying with the traditional rural or urban community, of questioning the monarchy and religious legitimacy of privileges, was the issue of the place of the individual in this \u201cdisenchanted world\u201d. The withering of the principle deriving class inequalities from origin brought about a process whereby people sooner or later ceased to be subjects in a hierarchically structured world and became equal members of a civil society based on division of labour. With increasing social mobility and ever more powerful administration and bureaucracy the role of social communication <\/em>was also growing; it went far beyond the framework of traditional rural and urban communities. At the same time, daily experience showed that communication was much easier with people using a tongue akin to the native dialect, that is using \u2013 depending on the social status \u2013 a similar spoken or written language.<\/p>\n

This was an\u00a0instructive experience, for thanks to participation in an\u00a0education system developing at\u00a0varying rates of vigour people were capable of imagining a\u00a0community possessing certain common features \u2013 subject to one ruler, inhabiting the\u00a0same historical land and having the\u00a0same past or using a\u00a0language or dialect comprehensible to its members.<\/p>\n

This generated, or rather activated \u2013 first in the\u00a0minds of the\u00a0educated minority \u2013 the\u00a0belief that the\u00a0relations and bonds characteristic of the\u00a0old society would gradually vanish. They perceived this vanishing as a\u00a0restructuring or disintegration of class society into a\u00a0community based on the\u00a0division of labour, with all members having the\u00a0same rights, understanding each other better, sharing the\u00a0same fate, having the\u00a0same interests and being capable of acting in solidarity.<\/p>\n

This vision was based on the pre-existing \u2013 since the Enlightenment \u2013 idea of homeland<\/em>, the good of which every educated man was obliged to serve \u2013 it was the Enlightenment concept of patriotism described previously. This idea found various political expressions: either as constitutional monarchy, often characterised by the notion of social justice strongly imbued religiously, or as a constitutional state built on revolutionary foundations, that is a republic.<\/p>\n

So the forms varied but there was no alternative to the new structures of the social order and the cultural transformations of society. In other words, the only way of structuring modern society known to us is the version based on elements referred to as \u201cnational\u201d.<\/p>\n

It is only now, then, that we reach for this basic term usually mentioned at the start: \u201cnation<\/em>\u201d. As I have said, this term functioned in all literary languages from that time and had positive <\/em>connotations, although it was used in various meanings: referring to the homeland or political regime, in the context of independence, feudal privileges, individual freedom or defence from external threat. In several languages an alternative term existed \u2013 for example the \u201cpeople\u201d in German, also understood as a positive value.<\/p>\n

Initially, therefore, the nation was not a previously prepared programme or project according to which society was to be reorganised, but the term perfectly described the new social and cultural reality, which \u2013 regardless of definitions \u2013 emerged from social reorganisation and was named the \u201cnation\u201d. This is not to deny the fact that in the 19th century a cultural transfer also occurred, when with some delay new national movements started to form, adopting (or intending to adopt) an existing nation as a model. Not only in Central Europe but also in Catalonia \u2013 slightly later, that is around 1900 \u2013 one could observe a move from the term \u201cregionals\u201d to \u201cnationals\u201d. In some European languages there was no abstract noun describing the nation, so appropriate new words were created (for example, kansa<\/em> in Finnish).<\/p>\n

What was the aim of this strange thought experiment? First, it served to illustrate in a more comprehensible way that the emergence of European nations was shaped by factors also clearly present in other parts of the world.<\/p>\n

Second, I wanted to explain that in the process described as the forming of the modern nation neither the idea of its creation nor the idea of nationalism played the role of the so-called primus movens<\/em>. Nevertheless, in later times the nation became a cultural and even ethical value in itself<\/em>, a mandatory principle of life in solidarity.<\/p>\n

The foundations for this situation had in a sense been programmed by the Enlightenment idea of patriotism. A patriotic representative of the Enlightenment considered it his duty to serve the people living in his homeland, although this was not tantamount to identifying with these people. It is a different matter with a modern patriot, who identifies with \u201chis\u201d people. This ethical redirecting found its reflection in the definition of a nation. The patriotically minded class of educated people regarded it as obvious that a helpful means of overcoming the identity crisis would be the use of the term \u201cnational\u201d, defining the new identity from that moment on.<\/p>\n

So far, this discussion has been taking place in perhaps excessively abstract terms, and it is high time to find out to what extent this theory squares with empirical, historical reality. First I will repeat that nation-forming processes not only were non-synchronic, that is occurred in various periods, but also possessed various social and political contents. The basic difference was that in a number of cases the modern nation was shaped through internal reorganisation of a state existing uninterruptedly for centuries, that is a state nation with its own ruling class, homogenous high culture and a written language, while in others this process was marked by a vision of a nation-to-be, to be realised through a national movement.<\/p>\n

In order to base our reflections on specific examples of these two kinds of nation-forming processes, we have to imagine the map of Europe from the early 19th century. On the one hand we will find a limited number of states almost homogenous in ethnic terms: France, Holland, Portugal and Sweden, and two states with a dominant old state nation \u2013 Spain and Great Britain, countries inhabited by other ethnic groups besides the dominant one.<\/p>\n

On the other hand we have the so-called ethnies<\/em> (a term introduced by Anthony Smith), out of which in many cases independent nations emerged; most of them managed to form their own state. This process was neither historically \u201cnecessary\u201d nor pre-programmed by \u201cnationalisms\u201d. In fact, not every group turned into a separate nation. This process ended in success in three multiethnic empires in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the West (the Irish, the Catalonians, the Flemish, the Norwegians, the Basques). In these cases the path to a fully formed nation (even not possessing its own state) led through national movements.<\/p>\n

It is not my aim to present the history of national movements in detail. I will limit myself to the remark that most of them sooner or later achieved their goal. The main issue was accepting the national identity by the people, which was supposed to help in shaping an autonomous culture, written language and a full social structure of the nation-to-be and to safeguard a certain degree of participation in administration and political decision-making.<\/p>\n

Stateless nations emerged from the idea of the nation-to-be mostly in the second half of the 19th century. In their programmes they did not even raise the question of national independence, hoping only for achieving autonomy. In fact we know only a few national movements which managed to establish a state before the First World War. Almost in all cases these were countries located on the south-eastern fringes of Europe (Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) as well as Norway, which became an independent state only in the early 20th century. To understand and interpret the specific stereotypes and political culture of the \u201csmall nations\u201d we must remember this difference.<\/p>\n

I will quote a few examples of such stereotypes: for members of small nations their national existence was (and still is) not an obvious fact \u2013 these nations repeatedly felt obliged to prove their aspirations to autonomy. For a long time after the success of national movements a stereotype of external threat to the nation and its interests dominated; in some cases this problem is still relevant. One can also notice the worship of simple folk as an authority or saviour of the nation, often accompanied by a liking for egalitarian democracy. Another stereotype is where a special role is assigned to education (of the people) perceived as an element of national identity. More frequently than in the case of state nations one can encounter here a kind of provincialism, understood as a deliberate isolation from the \u201cgrand world\u201d and being satisfied with lesser ambitions in work and culture, coupled with a distrust towards all things foreign. Moreover, the formerly stateless nations did not and do not have any experiences as colonisers, and only a few Western European nations (the Scots, the Welsh, the Catalonians) took an active part in the colonial expansion of their state nations, profiting from it.<\/p>\n

Concluding my reflections on the origin of the modern nation, I would like to warn against a certain wrong perspective which for me is a historical trap. The national present is very often seen from the perspective of 19th-century moral categories and vice versa: the past of nations and the behaviour of their members is often interpreted in line with today\u2019s criteria. As a result many researchers, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, with blatant arrogance and using today\u2019s criteria, appraise 19th-century national movements as \u201cnationalist\u201d or \u201cethnic\u201d and transfer this judgement onto selected contemporary nations or national movements. Sometimes they are right, but usually they are mistaken.<\/p>\n

What remains of the nation in Europe and in the world?<\/strong><\/h1>\n

What is the condition of the nation in Europe and in the contemporary world? Although the national community was formed as one of the elements of modernity, it is fair to ask about its role or even legitimacy in the period of postmodernism. Has the nation fulfilled its social role, and is it therefore entering its twilight years? This is not a new question: as many as one hundred years ago such a prognosis was formulated by Rosa Luxemburg (and slightly less radically by Lenin).<\/p>\n

I still remember genuine Leninists who attempted to predict when and how it would come to pass. Their only specific proposal was the\u00a0discredited conception of the\u00a0\u201cSoviet people\u201d \u2013 a\u00a0supranation to which other nations would be subordinated.<\/p>\n

One\u00a0could draw a\u00a0parallel between this conception and the\u00a0contemporary phantasms of some Euro-enthusiasts, prophesying the\u00a0downfall of the\u00a0nation or the\u00a0dissolution of \u201cnationalism\u201d in the\u00a0common European identity. I will not analyse these predictions \u2013 if only because our everyday experiences belie them. But\u00a0I would like to point to a\u00a0certain misunderstanding resulting from the\u00a0fact that too little attention is paid to the\u00a0aforementioned difference between the\u00a0emotionally coloured term \u201cnation\u201d and the\u00a0rational, administrative or social and political reality of the\u00a0nation state. By\u00a0the\u00a0way: what is the\u00a0power of the\u00a0emotional potential of European identity?<\/p>\n

Considering the\u00a0development of the\u00a0\u201cnation\u201d from a\u00a0macrohistorical and pan-European perspective, one can clearly see a\u00a0certain significant difference between the\u00a021st century and earlier times: currently the\u00a0nation state is a\u00a0European norm, an\u00a0ordinary state of affairs. The\u00a019th century left behind only a\u00a0few stateless nations, almost all in Western Europe. Most European nations were formed without a\u00a0state and in this shape they became elements of the\u00a0European norm; moreover, by no means all representatives of their 19th century political elites longed for the\u00a0establishment of their own state. But\u00a0this is not the\u00a0only difference present since the\u00a019th century within the\u00a0social group called the\u00a0\u201cnation\u201d.<\/p>\n

Comparing the\u00a0communities which in the\u00a019th century formed in large social groups called \u201cnations\u201d with the\u00a0social reality currently described by this term and seen in the\u00a0global context, we discover such large differences that a\u00a0radical sceptic could claim that a\u00a0\u201cclassic\u201d nation (as a\u00a0community) exists only in the\u00a0form of traditional national institutions and as a\u00a0memory that is constantly brought up-to-date. A thesis formulated in such a\u00a0radical way is difficult to maintain, but I perceive in it a\u00a0certain rational element. Let\u00a0us therefore ask what remains from the\u00a0bonds and values so significant for the\u00a0European nation in the\u00a019th century.<\/p>\n

Currently, the\u00a0nation is no longer perceived as a\u00a0\u201cvalue in itself\u201d; instead, the\u00a0importance of civil society (organised according to national and state rules) is underlined. We\u00a0can also easily conclude that the\u00a0emotional attractiveness of civil society is smaller than the\u00a0power of the\u00a0idea of national society in the\u00a019th century.<\/p>\n

In\u00a0the\u00a0context of the\u00a0current neoliberal individualism the\u00a0humanist imperative of serving humanity through serving the\u00a0nation sounds alien.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0term \u201cnational interest\u201d is most often used as a\u00a0slogan in political agitation, and it is above all the\u00a0interests of the\u00a0citizens which can count on acceptance and support.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0words about the\u00a0national interest sound serious only in the\u00a0context of competitiveness of a\u00a0given country in trade and industry, while the\u00a0classic optimism connected with the\u00a0idea of progress of a\u00a0nationally organised society is perceived with disapproval or, at\u00a0best, is questioned.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0majority of national codes, based on common historical tradition, have lost their validity: historical awareness is usually limited to contemporary history, utilised as an\u00a0instrument of political struggle.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0common features of high and folk cultures (characteristic of the\u00a0\u201cclassic\u201d period of nations), on which the\u00a0cultural national codes were based, no longer exist: the\u00a0distance between high culture of the\u00a0narrow intellectual elite and the\u00a0strongly globalised (that is non-national) culture passed on by the\u00a0media is growing ever faster. This medially globalised (and Americanised) culture is gradually replacing or marginalising national cultures.<\/p>\n

In\u00a0 this context, the\u00a0 national language is also losing in importance, descending from the\u00a0highest realms of national values and symbols.<\/p>\n

These deficits are partly compensated for by a\u00a0new force \u2013 unknown in the\u00a019th century \u2013 reinforcing the\u00a0sense of identity: this is sport as mass entertainment.<\/p>\n

An\u00a0important factor weakening national feelings is the\u00a0pluralisation of identity. While previously national identity was regarded as an\u00a0all-encompassing and mandatory form of belonging, today we know \u2013 and we use this knowledge \u2013 that every individual has many identities and that one can even claim two or more national identities. This leads to a\u00a0weakening or obfuscation of the\u00a0once clear dividing line between US and THEM.<\/p>\n

Also important to remember is the\u00a0difference resulting from facilitated horizontal mobility: we now observe a\u00a0 process of emergence of supranational elites, which do have a\u00a0national belonging but ignore it. These elites can find jobs and earnings in any place in Europe and the\u00a0world, and their language of communication is not their native language but the\u00a0lingua franca, that is English.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0obviousness of national existence for almost all European nation states does not exclude relics and modified manifestations of national identity.<\/p>\n

Among the\u00a0 positive relics, I include above all the\u00a0demonstrations of national solidarity, important for society, occurring in crisis situations or during natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes.<\/p>\n

Sudden explosions of nationalism in some post-communist countries have been regarded as negative relics. I will limit myself here to a\u00a0short comment. These explosions are brief repetitions of national movements, occurring in conditions analogous to those which I described as a\u00a0\u201cclassic\u201d situation of identity crisis. This time the\u00a0process happened in the\u00a0conditions of highly developed social communication and fervent political struggle. The\u00a0ethnic element was formulated largely in negative terms: as a\u00a0rejection of the\u00a0communist dictatorship.<\/p>\n

A much more widespread, negative and permanent component is the growing xenophobia, directed at such \u201cothers\u201d as immigrants \u2013 often manifested in a derivative form of a colonial-nationalist arrogance, but usually just a primitive reaction to the new phenomenon of multiculturalism.<\/p>\n

Let\u00a0us now turn to the\u00a0global impact of the\u00a0discussed concepts. In\u00a0the\u00a0second half of the\u00a020th century the\u00a0terms \u201cnation\u201d and \u201cnationalism\u201d spread all over the\u00a0world, and today they have a\u00a0life of their own. New\u00a0states on the\u00a0territories of former colonies adopted the\u00a0name \u201cnation\u201d. Soon afterwards, or even simultaneously, a\u00a0growing number of tribes or ethnic groups expressed an\u00a0ambition to be recognised as a\u00a0nation.<\/p>\n

Some Asian and Latin American countries proclaimed themselves \u201cnations\u201d even earlier, during modernisation and in the\u00a0initial stages of capitalism. Although an\u00a0analogy with Europe could have been drawn on the\u00a0basis of facts regarding the\u00a0modernisation itself, the\u00a0social, cultural and political circumstances as well as the\u00a0beginnings of the\u00a0process were completely different. Political scientists and sociologists did not hesitate to label these events as \u201cnationalism\u201d, usually without noticing that their classifications are completely divorced from reality.<\/p>\n

In\u00a0other words, the\u00a0thoughtless use of the\u00a0term \u201cnationalism\u201d opened the\u00a0door in research \u2013 and perhaps also in politics \u2013 to a\u00a0series of misunderstandings and false interpretations, emerging from na\u00efve confusing of social formations which are completely different culturally (but bear the\u00a0same name). The\u00a0indigenous European term \u201cnation\u201d was imported (together with \u201cnationalism\u201d) to non-European countries only because they referred to themselves with that label. This process was usually accompanied by positive associations of the\u00a0term \u201cnationalism\u201d \u2013 this was about a\u00a0struggle against colonial exploitation by external actors and overcoming internal oppression.<\/p>\n

Of\u00a0course, one cannot halt the\u00a0process (and the\u00a0excesses coming with it) of cultural transfer, but we may fairly expect independent scientists to account in their analysis for the\u00a0fact that historical conditions, traditions and social-cultural roots of global \u201cnationalism\u201d make it significantly different from the\u00a0process which produced the\u00a0European nations.<\/p>\n

Concluding my reflections, I will sum up this confusing of concepts as a \u201cglobal trap\u201d. What does this trap consist of? It is generally assumed that the majority of the first freedom fighters, representatives of new African and Asian (and partly also Latin American) nations, used national ideas not so much to achieve internal cultural integration of state communities but to boost their own power and sometimes also to enrich themselves. Describing these events as \u201cnationalism\u201d does not seemingly come into conflict with assigning this model to the same category as the European nationalism and with using it in reference to the past, for \u201cnationalism\u201d had existed earlier and everywhere.<\/p>\n

On the basis of the general premises, some recognised theoreticians have claimed that nations \u2013 regardless of the place and time of their emergence \u2013 are just constructs or even inventions of frustrated intellectuals or power-crazed politicians. Perhaps these theories are justified in the case of Africa or Asia, but they are clearly contradicted by our empirical knowledge about the history of European nation-building processes.<\/p>\n

These divergences \u2013 and I return here to my point of departure \u2013 remind us of the methodical threat of divorcing concepts from reality mentioned earlier. The result of this divorce is that depending on the social and cultural conditions the same word describes completely different segments of society or political types of organised communities. What in the early 20th century was called nation in Europe now exists rather as historical background and reminiscences, and what is currently labelled as nation outside Europe is a completely different social and cultural community from the former (preserved to our times only as relics) European nation. And the word \u201cnationalism\u201d functions as a desired sobriquet \u2013 although usually concealing negative associations \u2013 which can be attached to any entity.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the study of the tension between the concept imported from Europe and the African or Asian reality is a fascinating task for future scholarship.<\/p>\n

In conclusion, we should emphasise that regardless of the specific and autonomous existence of non-European nations, the institutionalised reality of the nation is also undergoing significant changes in its European homeland. The process of emergence of nation states turned national existence into state existence, as a result of which national ideas became an object of political struggles, manipulated and controlled by politics. In short, we often get the impression that the national community, for which an individual was ready to fight and make sacrifices and which he regarded as centrum securitas<\/em>, is gradually losing its original function. It has not died or vanished, but it lost its humanistic legacy and it still exists in the form of the state as a framework for the actual social community, but it is to a growing extent transferred into the sphere of words and rhetoric as a pretext for political struggle. It opens the door for demagogues and may be exploited by the media.<\/p>\n

So the answer to the question from the title of this text, namely if today\u2019s Europe needs nations, will be sceptical, or at least ambiguous. Yes, Europe does need nations; we need the principle of responsibility for supraindividual community, reflexive solidarity with the national collective, cultivating national cultures and the belief that constructive work serves not only the nation but also entire humanity. But such a concept of the nation does not exist any more and, if it does, then only as a memory, (old-fashioned) memento<\/em>, lieux de m\u00e9moire<\/em>. The nation survived to the present on innumerable stages where political struggles are played out, driven by individual or party interests, but the impact of supranational processes is increasingly pushing the national idea to the sidelines. I would venture a claim that this kind <\/em>of nation is of not much use for future Europe.<\/p>\n

Unfortunately I cannot conceive of a positive solution to this situation on the level of reality. But in the sphere of concepts, evoking the original humanistic nation-building ideals could introduce the distinction between egoistic nationalism and positive patriotism as an instrument of civic education.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n <\/div>\r\n <\/div>\r\n <\/div>\r\n<\/section>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"featured_media":2292,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"tags":[337,330],"region":[],"kraj":[],"magazyn":[235],"class_list":["post-2482","artykul","type-artykul","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","tag-history","tag-politics","magazyn-herito-08en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nWhat Does Europe Need Nations for? - herito<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"What is the condition of the nation in Europe and in the contemporary world? 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